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 “Those nights were dark and gentle. Great masses of people 
walked silently in the streets... holding their breath, waiting. It 
was a great Sunday. As if humanity had been born again.” 
“We got in haste to find out what did workers want and what 
should they want and what is that socialism that workers want. 
Everyone I knew had the solution clear: socialism means that 
everyone gets an equal amount, so we take the property of the rich 
and share it with the poor so that everyone becomes equally poor. 
And besides, usually those rich people will also be killed.” 
  
(Hella Wuolijoki on the Great Strike of 1905)1 
 
 
                                                 
1  Wuolijoki, Hella: Yliopistovuodet Helsingissä. Weilin+Göös, Helsinki 1973. p. 99, 107. Translation by Juha Uski 
(JU). 
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Johan Kock and the events of 1905 and 1906 in Helsinki 
 
This research project considers the actions of the Finnish Captain Johan Adolf Kock (1861-1914), the 
temporary leader of the workers' security cadres in Helsinki during the Great Strike of 1905 and the 
rebellion at the Sveaborg Sea Fortress in 1906. Kock was a former professional soldier who had 
become a businessman after he chose to leave the Russian army. He was elected by the strike 
committee as the temporary chief of police in Helsinki during the Great Strike of 1905 which paralyzed 
the whole of Finland, immediately after the national strike in the main part of the Russian Empire. In 
1906 he was one of the leaders in an armed rebellion against the Empire which in Helsinki took place 
mainly at the Sveaborg Sea Fortress. The two events have some similarities in the fact that both of 
them were directed against the ruling order – both were rebellions against the established order 
imposed by the Czar. But the two events also have important differences: the first one is remarkably 
nonviolent, but the second one is a violent rebellion related to an attempt of a coup. Also Johan Kock's 
participation and its outcome differs dramatically: during the Great Strike, Kock played the part of a 
skilled conciliator and became a respected hero, whereas during the Sveaborg mutiny, Kock instigated 
the participation of the workers' security cadres in a violent rebellion without the consent of any of the 
legalised Finnish political factions, had a nervous breakdown and had to escape from the country. It is 
the contrast between the two events that awakened my interest. 
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Johan Kock is mostly mentioned in history writing only as the leader of the National Guard during the 
Great Strike of 1905 and as the leader of the Red Guard during the last days of the Great Strike and 
during the Sveaborg mutiny. It is those two events that form the historical image of who is Johan Kock 
for most of the people who have heard of him. 
 
These two events of 1905 and 1906 are central to the accounts about Johan Kock – but in many 
accounts of the events, not much is said about Kock. Only in those accounts which examine the events 
closer, more is said about Johan Kock. In regard to the Sveaborg mutiny, Kock is more prominent. 
These are events which involve a great amount of people and even though Johan Kock plays a central 
part in both events in Helsinki, he as a single person is not a defining factor in the events. On the other 
hand, neither is it sensible to reduce the life story of a person into two singular events in his life. Thus 
while I will focus on the combination of these events and Johan Kock, the events and the person need 
also to be considered in a more holistic manner. 
 
It is not easy to combine these demands in a project that has such limited scope. To narrow the focus I 
have chosen to concentrate on a central theme in the events; that of violence. Violence here appears as 
a method for social change or for preventing social change. I am including some considerations about 
the objectives of those who believe in violent methods for social change as a counterforce to violent 
methods designed to prevent social change. 
 
 
Problem formulation 
 
How is the theme of violence reflected in the published literature about the actions of Johan Kock 
during the Great Strike of 1905 and the Sveaborg rebellion of 1906 in Helsinki, Finland? 
 
 
Theme and approach 
 
History is a complex discipline – considered as a science, it combines different disciplines, both 
humanistic and social sciences; considered as an art, it touches profound issues of philosophy and 
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literature. In this project, the focus is on political events, but also economic, social and cultural factors 
are considered; the research is not only about events, but also about an individual who made choices 
based on complex influences and intentions. The social group where he acted – the Red Guard – plays 
also a very central role. 
 
My approach is to focus on a theme – that of violence – and discuss the relations between the person of 
Johan Kock, his actions and the events of 1905 general strike in Helsinki and the Sveaborg mutiny of 
1906 as reflected in the writings of historians and contemporaries of Kock – as well as himself. The 
focus on violence is interesting to me because of its relation to peace research, which is a significant 
field of international history research. Peace and nonviolence requires the growth of understanding of 
violence. Here violence will be interpreted as it is described by the sources and this may be different 
from present-day interpretations of what violence is. Therefore let it be made explicit already here: 
When my chosen sources describe violence, they refer primarily to physical violence, mostly armed 
violence perpetuated by political factions. In accounts about Johan Kock there are also references to 
other kinds of violent situations but these fall outside the framework of the events of the Great Strike 
and the Sveaborg mutiny, which are both political events involving organized mass activity. 
 
In terms of themes present in research in Europe in modern times, my research has a lot of relation to 
the theme of revolutionary versus evolutionary socialism.2 Johan Kock is involved in revolutionary 
socialist activities in a moment where socialism is emerging into the mainstream politics in Finland and 
the questions of revolutionary versus evolutionary socialism are debated and tested in the Finnish 
society, as will be considered below. 
 
From a methodological point of view, this research considers relevant historical writings and discusses 
and interprets them, focusing on the theme of violence. Some conclusions and perspectives are reached, 
but these are also considered as interpretations. This method corresponds to the methodology of 
hermeneutics, where the hermeneutic circle means to consider the whole of existing knowledge again 
and again in the light of added knowledge. This means an open reflection where the researcher 
questions not only their understanding of the issue that is being researched, but also their own 
                                                 
2 Lennart Berntson's lecture ”Historical Perspectives: What does that mean in a European context?” at Roskilde 
University, February 2008 
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presuppositions towards the issue.3 The purpose is not to reach some final truth about the case, but to 
examine varied interpretations and to bring to light considerations and points of view that enrich and 
deepen the existing dialogue. A main presupposition that I start with is that Johan Kock as a leader of 
armed troops was an adherent of violent means. Another presupposition I admit having is that the 
workers' movement of those times was good for the society. As a result of making this research my 
opinion may not have changed but the reflection and questioning has brought more nuances to my 
views and hopefully also the same occurs with the reader's views. As a hermeneutic researcher I 
attempt to interpret and verify the solution to the research question with a combination or alternating of 
compassion and distance, comparing texts and reaching a synthesis as a critical probability.4 
 
To ensure that the reader can follow my reasoning, I am also obliged to give an overview of the current 
historical understanding of the historical time and space that this research interprets. I am constructing 
a linear story with references to varying interpretations. Thus I am relating with my sources in two 
ways: I'm analyzing what kind of interpretations of Johan Kock's actions and the social framework of 
those actions do they offer; and synthesizing their descriptions related to the chosen historical events. 
 
 
Selection of sources 
 
The most thorough and impartial scientific research on the events of the Great Strike and the Sveaborg 
mutiny is found in works dealing with the period in a broader perspective. I have used here many of the 
most distinguished Finnish researchers' works from the whole period between the mentioned events 
and the present moment. I have also looked into a couple of western foreign researchers' works, but 
directly none of the Russian researchers' works, since those have mainly not been translated. 
 
I have selected the sources in terms of the relevance of the themes of their research. Answering my 
research question means not only to take in account those writings that deal with Johan Kock 
particularly but I also need to include information and views on the historical framework where Kock 
acted. 
                                                 
3    Olden-Jørgensen, Sebastian: Til kilderne! Gads Forlag, Copenhagen 2001. p. 28 
4 Olden-Jørgensen 2001: 29 
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Particularly I have chosen Hannu Soikkanen's works about the workers' movement in Finland, written 
in 1960s and 1970s. Soikkanen's research is particularly useful for me since it centres on the workers' 
movement and there are a lot of considerations about the theme of violence. Soikkanen goes a lot into 
the ideological background as well. 
 
Another much applied source here is Y.K.Laine's The Breakthrough of Democracy from 1945.5 Y.K. 
Laine writes quite a lot about Kock as well, and though mostly Laine's writing is an account of events, 
he does also directly express some opinions about Johan Kock's actions. Laine had grown up 
surrounded by the political history of the workers' movement as can be noticed in his book where he 
mentions also personal experiences. His mother was elected to the Finnish parliament from the Social 
Democratic Party (from now on referred to as SDP) as one of the first female parliamentarians of the 
world in 1907. His father, on the other hand, was working for the Young Finnish Party.6 
 
I have also particularly paid attention to how the contemporaries of Johan Kock interpreted the events 
of 1905 and 1906 immediately after they occurred. Under consideration are also the views that Kock 
himself published in his 1906 book about the Great Strike of 1905. 
 
I am conscious that Soikkanen's and Laine's personal relations to the workers' movement may influence 
the way they write and the concepts they favour, but especially Soikkanen also considers critically 
these issues and the workers' movement, and his writings appear generally very well researched. I refer 
to the research of prominent later historians and others throughout the project report when necessary. 
They also give me second hand access to documents that I was not able to access myself, such as 
documents written in Russian, which is a language that I am not familiar with. 
 
Besides Soikkanen and Laine, specifically in relation to Johan Kock the biographical research by Antti 
Häkkinen, published in 2000, was very helpful. Like Soikkanen's, also Häkkinen's work is based on a 
wide array of sources. Whereas I have not personally gone through archived documents like letters, 
                                                 
5    Laine, Y.K.: Suomen poliittisen työväenliikkeen historia I: Kansanvaltaisuuden läpimurto, Tammi, Helsinki 
1945. 
6 Laine 1945: 353 
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newspapers, public announcements, official records and minutes of meetings, the researches that I 
mainly refer to are all based on extensive work in the archives. 
 
The European historical framework of the period I will base on the work Europa 1800-2000, which 
was published by Roskilde University in 2003 and is used in our studies as a reference work. It is 
beyond the scope of this project to start questioning the claims of the mentioned work and I will simply 
adopt its hypothesis. 
 
 
The Grand Duchy of Finland 
 
The 19th Century was a time of great technological changes in Europe. Our current computerised way 
of life owes much to those changes. The network of train tracks spread through Europe during that 
period, including Finland. The telegraph network made instant communication between distant 
locations possible.7 Physical movement and the movement of information was thus accelerated and 
with the acceleration of movement one could say that the historical time was accelerated, which is still 
continuing. New industrial forms of production broke the traditional agricultural cycle's rhythm and 
systems of human relations.8 Not everyone was simply enthusiastic about this process; the integrity of 
the society (as well as of nature) was considered to be endangered.9 
 
According to Berntson, Hálfdanarson and Jensen, modern corporations and banking system are based 
on the initiatives of 19th Century.10 Market liberalism was one of the organizational responses to the 
possibilities and challenges of the moment. Another response was the formation of varied kinds of 
associations, peoples' movements and clubs that provided meaningful social frameworks. Also, a 
socially active and increasingly democratic national State apparatus started to develop in European 
countries. This was beneficial for the development of liberal markets but it was importantly more than 
                                                 
7     Berntson, Lennart & Halfdanarson, Gudmundur & Jensen, Henrik: Europa 1800-2000. Roskilde 
Universitetsforlag, Roskilde 2003. p.72-74 
8     Soikkanen, Hannu: Sosialismin tulo Suomeen. WSOY, Porvoo 1961. p.54 
9 Berntson et al. 2003:76 
10 Berntson et al. 2003:80 
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just that – it was a project based on the ideals of the French revolution: equality, fraternity and 
liberty.11 
 
In 1807 Russia had suffered a defeat to Napoleon's forces and signed a peace treaty which obliged 
Russia to persuade Sweden to join the alliance with Napoleon. Diplomatic means to realize that failed 
and thus in the winter of 1808, Russia attacked Sweden. Finland had been part of the Kingdom of 
Sweden for hundreds of years but now it was taken over by the Russian Empire led by the Czar 
Alexander I. After designing the new governmental structure of the Grand Duchy of Finland, the Czar 
gathered the Finnish estates12 to “land days” (“lantdagar”) where they signed the treaty of laws and 
pledged loyalty to the Czar. This occasion was until recently proclaimed in the historiography of 
Finland as the establishment of the constitution of the autonomous state of Finland. Recent research has 
pointed out that this was a myth constructed by the nationalists of late 19th Century. This historical 
myth is closely related with the events of 1905 and 1906 and I will return to this point shortly below.13  
 
Towards the end of 19th Century, modern changes mentioned above started to arrive to Finland and 
through these the Finnish society grew more independent from Russian control. Municipal self-
government was re-modelled according to economic liberalism rather than traditional corporate 
representation14 and towards the end of the century elementary schools started growing rapidly as well 
as the industrial working class.15 The growth of the timber industry, the timber trade to Western 
Europe and finally in the last decade of the century the ability to keep the Finnish ports open 
throughout the year with the help of icebreakers meant that Russia lost its dominant position in 
Finland's foreign trade.16 
 
                                                 
11 Berntson et al. 2003:80-81 
12 The estates were the privileged classes who had the traditional right to elect their representatives to common 
decisionmaking bodies. There were four estates in Finland: nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants. Landless labourers 
and landleasing farmers were excluded from political decisionmaking. 
13   Jussila, Osmo & Hentilä, Seppo & Nevakivi, Jukka: Suomen poliittinen historia 1809-1995. WSOY, Helsinki 
1996. p.12-19; Kirby, David: A Concise History of Finland. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006. p.71-76; Jussila, 
Osmo: Suomen historian suuret myytit. WSOY, Helsinki 2007. p.116-130 
14    Alapuro, Risto: State and Revolution in Finland. University of California Press, Berkeley 1988. p.103 
15    Tuominen, Jussi et al. (eds.): Suurlakkovuosi 1905. Suomen Työväenliikkeen Historiaseura ry., Kuopio 1955. p.7 
16    Jutikkala, Eino & Pirinen, Kauko: A History of Finland. WSOY, Porvoo 1996. p.351 
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Among the varied associations of the social base that were born in those times around Europe, in 
Finland the most prominent ones were the temperance movement, new religious expressions especially 
in the form of “revivalism”, youth organisations and the workers' movement, as well as associations 
related to nationalism or national romanticism.17 The Finns considered Russia as a less developed 
country than Finland and the ideals of nationalism encountered a lot of adherence.18 
 
The political parties of the time included the Old Finns, who tended to favour the traditional social 
hierarchy and cultural orientation but in the framework of Finnish nationalism; the Young Finns, who 
stood for a more modern form of nationalism with economic policies of liberalism; the Swedish party, 
who defended the position of the remaining traditional Swedish-speaking elite; and finally, the 
Workers' Party, founded 189919 and renamed in 1903 as the Social Democratic Party (SDP).20 
 
Observing the growing threat from Germany, the Czar's government had attempted to integrate Finland 
more closely to Russia, but the Finns resisted friendly attempts.21 Finally in 1898 the Russian 
government took a hard line, sending the conservative Russian nationalist Nikolayi Bobrikov22 to 
serve as the new general-governor of Finland and as a first measure of assimilation instating a 
compulsory draft of Finnish men into the Russian military.23 The Finnish Senate did not accept the 
military bill, but sent it back to the Czar with proposals of modifications. The Czar replied by giving a 
declaration known as the February Manifesto (1899), where he let it be known that the Finnish Senate 
had no say in imperial level legislation. The Old Finns complied, but the Young Finns declared that the 
February Manifesto is an attack against Finland's constitutional rights. Thus the Old Finns came to be 
known as the moderates and the Young Finns as the constitutionalists. 
                                                 
17 Alapuro 1988: 102-105 
18 Jutikkala & Pirinen 1996: 352; Numminen, Jaakko et al. (eds.): Lenin ja Suomi. Osa I. Valtion Painatuskeskus, Helsinki 
1987. p.173 
19 Laine 1945: 203, 137 
20 Laine 1945: 154 
21 Alapuro 1988: 111, Kirby 2006: 124, 129 
22  According to Jutikkala & Pirinen, the Russian imperial nationalist Bobrikov was placed as the governor-general of 
Finland not because the political elite of the Czar’s court agreed with Bobrikov’s ideological extremism, but exactly 
because they did not agree with him and his personality. Bobrikov was placed in Finland so that they would not have to 
cooperate with him in St.Petersburg! (Jutikkala & Pirinen 1996: 353) David Kirby, on the other hand, writes that the 
appointment of Bobrikov was “part of a carefully concerted campaign to ensure the enforced reforms would be pushed 
through.” (Kirby 2006: 128) 
23   Huxley, Steven Duncan: Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland. SHS, Helsinki 1990. p.143; Kirby 2006: 128 
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A struggle ensued where the constitutionalists as well as the workers' movement opposed the draft and 
other “russification” measures through mostly nonviolent but also violent disobedience and protest.24 
The years 1899-1905 were and until recently have been referred to as “the years of oppression.” The 
name refers to the idea of Russia oppressing Finland which is a separate, constitutional state, which 
Finland however from a legal point of view was not, as recent research by Osmo Jussila has shown.25 
The Russians had never assigned the value of constitutional agreements to those specific agreements 
which the constitutionalists claimed would form the constitution of Finland.26 In any case the majority 
in Finland and Europe felt and believed that the February Manifesto was an act of aggression upon the 
Finnish people and two petitions were gathered to ask the Czar to withdraw it: the Great Petition, 
signed within one week (through a gargantuan national effort!) by more than half of the adult 
population in Finland (523.000 signatures); and the international Pro Finlandia, signed by over one 
thousand of the finest minds of Europe; “the most qualified representatives of literature, science, 
politics and art”, as Steven Duncan Huxley puts it in his research on the constitutionalist resistance to 
Russian dominance in Finland.27 The petitions had no effect on the Czar's policy. 
 
 
The radicalization of the workers' movement 
 
The modern ideologies of liberalism and socialism that gained ground in Finland during the period of 
Russian rule coincided on progressive optimism. Questioning the established truths, liberalism paved 
the way also for socialism.28 The workers' movement in Finland was first formed by the liberal 
educated classes in order to further liberalism and to prevent the rise of revolutionary socialism that had 
created conflicts in other countries.29 While in the cities the workers' movement took distance to 
liberal capitalism in the change of the century, in the countryside the workers' associations generally 
                                                 
24 Alapuro 1988: 112-113; Huxley 1990: 146-148 
25 Jussila 2007: 116-130 
26 Jussila 2007: 148 
27 Huxley 1990: 147 
28 Soikkanen 1961: 12 
29 This was openly admitted by the liberal founders and is referred to by several historians, among them: Soikkanen 1961: 
21-22; Palmgren, Raoul: Joukkosydän I. WSOY, Porvoo 1966. p.12-13; Jutikkala & Pirinen 1966: 351 
12 
maintained a conciliatory orientation until the Great Strike of 1905.30 
 
The idea of the liberals was that if the educational and social level of the workers can be raised 
gradually, then they will not take more radical positions calling for the distribution of wealth. 
Soikkanen considers that this was a mistaken interpretation of socialism as simply a protest movement, 
whereas for the workers socialism presented itself as a dream of a better future, an upward movement. 
Thus while in some cases the prevention of radicalization worked, in other cases the workers took 
advantage of the improvements of their position in order to strengthen the struggle for radical 
changes.31 
 
Before the campaign of resistance to the “russification” of Finland, the great masses in general believed 
in the authorities. The traditional belief was that the authorities were authorities because the almighty 
God had arranged things so.32 But as the public opinion in Finland, propagated by both the workers' 
movement as well as the constitutionalist part of the higher classes, widely considered the Russian 
government's actions during “the (first) period of oppression” as illegitimate, a more critical view on 
the structures of society gained ground.33 The Great Petition broke traditional hierarchies, since 
anyone's signature became significant in a petition directly to the Czar and even the archbishop of the 
Church faced opposition from rebellious priests who would not read the conscription lists during the 
Service.34 
 
Marxist thinking rejected stable moral references35 and as its ideas about the relativity of moral and 
immorality of the established institutions spread in this receptive political and cultural situation, the 
result was a reactionary idealism, a rebellion against the establishment without clarity about the 
positive objectives or the way to realize them. By some of the leading marxist theoreticians, reactionary 
ideals were considered as useful for mobilizing people, but others simply copied that agitation without 
                                                 
30 Soikkanen 1961: 204 
31 Soikkanen 1961: 27 
32 Soikkanen 1961: 72, 151-152 
33   Kujala, Antti: Vallankumous ja kansallinen itsemääräämisoikeus. SHS, Helsinki 1989. p.124; Soikkanen 1961: 
72-76, 151-152 
34 Soikkanen 1961: 73 
35 Soikkanen 1961: 73, 75 
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being aware that it had been meant as a means to a particular end.36 
 
To some, the rejection of an absolute moral meant that any means were acceptable. The murder of the 
hated governor-general Bobrikov in 1904 received broad acceptance both among the constitutionalists 
and the workers' movement, and in 1905 there were several political murders in Finland.37 
 
 
The Great Strike and the formation of the Red Guard 
 
In 1905, the Russian Empire was losing the war against Japan and its powers could not stand against 
the pressures from the revolutionaries and peoples' movements. The movements and the political 
factions demanded more civil rights and declared a general strike. The strike spread to Finland only 
when it was nearly finished in the main part of the Empire. Strike committees were together formed by 
constitutionalists and social democrats in countryside, but in the great centers, especially in Helsinki, 
the ways divided between constitutionalists and social democrats.38 In contrast to the Russian strike, 
the Finnish Great Strike was almost entirely without violence.39 Very few occasions of violence 
occurred during the strike – less than in any normal days, claims Hella Wuolijoki.40 
 
Immediately when the Great Strike had started and the conventional police forces also went in strike, a 
National Strike Guard was formed to keep order and prevent disturbances that could lead to unfortunate 
escalations. The name ”National Guard” was adopted from the French revolution, but according to 
Marja-Leena Salkola's research on the Workers' Guards it probably also is related to the fact that the 
national elite battalion called ”Finland Guard Battalion”, the last remaining national military unit after 
the closing of the distinctly Finnish military units in 1901, had been closed down a few months 
earlier.The workers' movement was the founder and a prominent actor in the Guard and the majority of 
the Guard were those from the workers' movement, wearing red armbands and known as the Red 
                                                 
36   Riihinen, Olavi & Hentilä, Kalevi & Roos, Jeja-Pekka: Vaikeat vuosikymmenet. Rautatieläisten liiton historia 1. 
Weilin+Göös, Tapiola 1975. p.160-161 
37 Soikkanen 1961: 75, 95 
38 Tuominen et al. 1955: 17 
39 Rasila & Jutikkala & Kulha quote it as “a revolution without blood”. Rasila, Viljo & Jutikkala, Eino & Kulha, Keijo K.: 
Suomen poliittinen historia 1905-1975. WSOY, Porvoo 1980. p.11 
40 Wuolijoki 1973: 99 
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Guard.41 The strike committee of the constitutionalists and the social democrats accepted Johan Kock 
as the leader of the National Guard as it was being formed, and after the strike he continued as the 
leader of the Red Guard, which continued to exist in case a new general strike was needed to ensure the 
practical implementation of the compromises given by the Czar in the end of the Great Strike. Kock 
also kept a continuous contact with the Russian governor-general. Already before the end of the Great 
Strike there was a split in the National Guard as the relations between the workers' movement and the 
constitutionalists grew tense, and during the last days of the strike there were two separately 
functioning Guards: the Red Guard and the “Protection Guard”42 of the constitutionalist students. The 
National Guard entirely ceased to exist once the strike was over.43 
 
During the Great Strike the role of the National Guard and of Johan Kock as its leader was that of 
preventing violent disturbances. Several sources indicate that there were a lot of rumours and fears of 
violence as well as fiery speeches where armed rebellion or revolution was adhered to, and it seems 
that in general Kock and the Guard succeeded in remaining calm and de-escalating potentially 
dangerous situations and tendencies – both between the Finns and the Russians as well as between the 
Finnish political factions and groups.44 On the other hand, according to Antti Kujala's research there 
are also informations that Kock tried to hoard as much weapons for the Guard as possible, though not 
very successfully.45 
 
The demands of the main instigators of the strike – the social democrats and the constitutionalists – 
differed. The constitutionalists were mainly interested in the restoration of the so-called constitutional 
order that was disrupted by the assimilation-related laws starting from 1899, whereas the social 
democrats took advantage of the situation in order to demand for more radical reforms – most 
importantly, a single chamber parliament with equal voting rights for all citizens. This demand did 
become one of the central demands of the whole strike, but towards the end of the strike there was a 
                                                 
41   Salkola, Marja-Leena: Työväenkaartien synty ja kehitys punakaartiksi 1917-18 ennen kansalaissotaa 1. Valtion 
painatuskeskus, Helsinki 1985. p.45-46 
42 In Finnish, “suojeluskaarti”. Translation JU 
43 Soikkanen 1961: 241; Soikkanen, Hannu: Kohti kansan valtaa 1. Oy Kirjapaino Ab, Vaasa 1975. p.92; Rasila & 
Jutikkala & Kulha 1980: 13; Laine 1945: 246-249 
44 Wuolijoki 1973: 103-104; Aspelin-Haapkylä, Eliel: Kirovuosien kronikka. Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, Helsinki 
1980. p.54-93; Soikkanen 1975: 81; Kock, Johan: Seitsemän päivää keskusasemalla. Kirjapainoyhtiö Valo, Helsinki 
1906. 
45 Kujala 1989: 146 
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disagreement between the constitutionalists and the social democrats about the method to progress 
towards the parliamentary reform. The social democrats were demanding a Peoples' Assembly.46 The 
constitutionalists in the city of Tampere had agreed to this demand, but in Helsinki, where the 
overwhelming military dominance of the Czar was more tangibly present in the form of the Sveaborg 
fortress and the battleships, only the Social Democrats agreed to this demand.47 Instead of a Peoples' 
Assembly, the workers' movement proposed now a temporary coalition government to work on the 
parliamentary reform. Johan Kock was himself part of the delegation that was to meet with the 
constitutionalists and the governor-general on board the Slava-battleship, but they were prevented from 
attending the meeting. The constitutionalists agreed the format of the temporary government with the 
governor-general and Kock was deeply disappointed. Furthermore, local administration in 
municipalities was to be formed with the lead of the constitutionalists alone.48 The Czar issued a new 
declaration known as the November Manifesto, and soon after the strike was ended.49 
 
The Great Strike as a demonstration of the power of the Finnish workers' movement but also of the 
Russian revolutionary movement created an opening for all those who were not content with the state 
of things. A new generation of active members entered the Finnish workers' movement. They were not 
formed in the old political landscape of negotiations and agreements, but in the new landscape of 
battles and disobedience.50 In the level of world-views, within the workers' movement a contradiction 
appeared between on the one hand the view that socialism was an altruist doctrine and opposed all 
kinds of violence, and on the other hand the concept of class struggle, which limited the scope of 
solidarity to only function within the working class. The altruist view was popular in Finland especially 
in 1890s and the class struggle view became popular especially after the Great Strike.51 
 
This distance between the “old school” and the “new school” also appears in relation to the Red Guard, 
which was composed mostly of young men. According to Hannu Soikkanen, the SDP leadership was 
suspicious of the loyalty of the Red Guard right from its formation. SDP issued warnings and 
                                                 
46 Kujala 1989: 132-133; Voionmaa, Väinö: Tampereen kaupungin historia. III osa: Tampereen historia viime 
vuosikymmeninä (1856-1905). Tampereen kaupunki, Tampere 1907-1910. p.384-388 
47 Kock 1906: 83; Laine 1945: 240-242 
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guidelines to the leadership of the Red Guard. The Guard's publications romanticized revolution and its 
leaders, including Johan Kock, were not pioneers of the workers' movement. Also on local level there 
were disputes and local workers' organizations complained that the Guard is being led in a 
“revolutionary direction” that they did not agree on.52 
 
Also Johan Kock himself wrote a small book about the Great Strike.53 In it, he tells of his own 
experience as the leader of the Guard. To him, the experience of the beginning of the strike and the 
voluntary work of the Guard was a source of great enthusiasm, like a dream come true: the dream of a 
socialistic utopia.54 In the light of the following year's events, notable in this book by Johan Kock are 
also his strategic considerations of the military power in the city of Helsinki and repeated references to 
the fact that the Sveaborg fortress dominates the city militarily. He also ponders on the possibility of a 
Russian military rebellion and even reveals that there were “rumours” of some Russian students who 
attempted during the Great Strike to agitate Russian soldiers at Sveaborg to mutiny.55 According to 
Erkki Salomaa, who bases his story on Russian bolshevik historians, on October 30th – the day when 
the strike spread to Finland – there was a demonstration of Russian soldiers at Sveaborg. At that 
occasion the leadership agreed to the demands of economic improvements of the life of the soldiers – 
but already in December all such promises were betrayed.56 
 
 
The moderates' views 
 
The first published concise history of the years 1899-1905 in Finland came out already in March of 
1906, written by Artturi Heikki Virkkunen, who later became history professor in Turku University.57 
In 1907 in the first parliamentary elections of Finland Virkkunen was elected from the list of the right 
wing Finnish Party, also known as the moderates or the Old Finns. The book is an insider's point of 
view, discussing openly from his party's point of view and telling how their situation and programme 
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was. Logically Virkkunen defends the moderates' stand – not saying that the Great Strike was bad, but 
that its success in ending the period of oppression did not take place thanks to any political faction: 
 
“[...] the November Manifesto and its influences were based on the historical events outside us, whose 
consequences and result could not be seen and cannot be seen by even the sharpest eye. Our own 
action has not had any decisive effect on these worldwide events.”58 
 
Finally he defends the conservative effort to maintain the administration of the country intact by stating 
that without that conservative effort it would be impossible to put in practice those promises that the 
Czar gave in the November Manifesto.59 To Virkkunen's conservative point of view, all of the factions 
who rebelled were therefore to be considered as basically irresponsible, potentially destructive and 
unable to organise society in a civil way and in harmonious relation with other existing powers such as 
the Czar. The established order is essential for the harmonious development of the society. Historical 
events, furthermore, appear as larger than their participants, as is commonplace in the conservative 
world-view. (The moderate party’s power was based on the estate of the clergy, and according to Eino 
Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen “the whole party had to some extent received a clerical colouring”.)60 
 
To the great joy of historians, another member of the moderate party, Professor Eliel Aspelin-Haapkylä 
kept an orderly diary during the Great Strike and it was published as a book in 1980. The situation of 
the changing balance of power can be observed from Aspelin-Haapkylä's notes from the meetings of 
the moderate party. The Social Democratic party is emerging during the strike as a considerable new 
power factor that may now through the demanded political reform reach the possibility to act in the 
political decisionmaking system. The moderates start considering the possibilities of allying themselves 
with the Social Democrats against the liberalists.61 At the same time Aspelin-Haapkylä is shocked by 
rumours that tell of violence perpetuated by crazed workers against members of upper class.62 He 
concludes however, that the strike ended happily without the shedding of blood ”primarily thanks to the 
self-control of the workers and secondly (or perhaps primarily) the tolerance of the governor-general – 
                                                 
58 Virkkunen 1906: 132. Translation JU. 
59 Virkkunen 1906: 133 
60 Jutikkala & Pirinen 1996: 362 
61 Aspelin-Haapkylä 1980: 59 
62 Aspelin-Haapkylä 1980: 58 
18 
that he did not mix into things with military force. The constitutionalists nowadays prefer to thank [the 
governor-general] Count Obolenski. [The moderates] talk with enthusiasm about the workers and say 
that we should now work for the good of the workers.”63 The task of the moderates is to civilize the 
workers, Aspelin-Haapkylä contends, so that a social democratic revolution can be avoided and that 
”peoples' power does not develop into a power that destroys culture.”64 
 
 
The mutiny 
 
The Red Guard was meant to exist until the parliamentary reform was secured. After the Great Strike it 
was led by Kaarlo Luoto, who later himself mentioned that his relations with the leadership of SDP 
were not very friendly due to the Party leadership's aversion towards violent methods. Luoto was fired 
in April 1906 and replaced by Kock who thus returned to the post of the leader of the Red Guard.65 
 
The parliamentary reform was decided in the Diet in May 1906 and some of the local branches of the 
Guard stopped their regular practices at that moment. In July 20th the Czar confirmed the electoral law 
and thus the Guard had fulfilled its official mission. However, it seems the chiefs of the Guard 
participated with Russian revolutionaries in meetings where a military rebellion was planned and 
because of this the Guard continued existing. The Great Strike Committee was still holding meetings in 
case the strike would need to be relaunched to secure the fulfillment of the reform, but they felt that a 
strike was not necessary or useful at that moment. They also considered that the Red Guard under 
Kock's leadership was going in another direction.66 
 
In Russia unrest continued after the strike of October 1905 and though some reforms were realized, in 
practice those were only temporary concessions from the government. As the conflict in Russia 
continued, the expectations of a revolution were strengthened also in Finland, where the legal reform 
process was accompanied by popular demonstrations.67 
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In Russia a violent revolution was propagated and terrorist methods were applied by the Socialist-
Revolutionary Party (SRP) and its armed organization. Among these revolutionaries there were also 
anarchists, who proposed direct economic struggle and the abolition of State as such. Strikes, especially 
general strikes, were a central method for anarchists, who also opposed war and the military 
establishment. The formation of voluntary citizen's Guards pleased many anarchists since it seemed to 
mean an attempt to replace the State's monopoly of violence with more decentralized forms of 
organization. Some of the anarchists used violent and terrorist methods whereas others were strictly 
nonviolent and did not participate in the SRP.68 
 
These notes on Russian SRP and the anarchists are interesting because it seems that Johan Kock was 
influenced by them and in some way also cooperating with them.69 According to both Erkki Salomaa 
and Raija Kock, who in 1969 wrote a research on Johan Kock's life,70 already when Johan Kock was 
serving in the military in Viipuri, in eastern Finland where the revolutionaries of St.Petersburg printed 
their materials, his home had become a meeting place for activists and revolutionaries. The same 
pattern was repeated in Helsinki and since Kock acted as a contact person between left and right wing 
revolutionaries, he became the preferred choice as the leader of the National Guard during the Great 
Strike: he was respected by all of the most radical and unpredictable elements and thus his lead was the 
best available guarantee of peace.71 When he took office, his first order was: ”All troublemakers here, 
it is that kind of people I need!” This, he says, was because he considered it safest that the 
troublemakers were under his eye and cooperating with sensible persons rather than running loose.72 
 
In April 1906 Johan Kock and two others participated in a meeting of the bolsheviks (the majority 
communists of Russia), where a military rebellion, organized together with the SRP, was being 
discussed. Soikkanen contends that it is not easy to know how much the Finnish Social Democratic 
Party knew about those plans. They did know something, since their delegate had in April participated 
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in a similar conference of the bolsheviks in Sweden.73 When the military rebellion started, the Party 
leadership told that since not all members of the different districts are present they will not make a final 
decision of their stand towards the rebellion. Hannu Soikkanen considers that there SDP was playing 
safe and wanted to remain in a favorable position in any case. As it became clearer that the mutiny was 
failing, the Party denounced the participation of the Red Guard in it.74 
 
The Sveaborg mutiny in the end of July 1906 was a rebellion of Russian soldiers stationed in the sea 
fortress outside Helsinki. Since December 1905, as their demands had not been met by the army 
leadership, radical views had spread among the soldiers, and in secret meetings the uprising was 
planned.75 Simultaneously, there was a rebellion of the navy in Kronstadt and an attempt on the life of 
Prime Minister Stolypin. Besides the evidence of discussions about such plans among the 
revolutionaries, also the simultaneity of the events points to the probability of a revolutionary plot. The 
Red Guard led by Johan Kock participated in the mutiny, which however failed as the rebels had not 
managed to capture the necessary war ships that would have supported the uprising. Many were killed 
in the battle with the troops loyal to the Czar.76 
 
Kock had also during the mutiny declared – with simply his own authority – a general strike,77 which 
was not followed very widely as none of the political parties supported it. To spread the strike in 
Helsinki, members of the Red Guard tried to impose it on public transport forcibly. The 
constitutionalist Protection Guard came to set the trams at Hakaniemi in movement again, and this led 
to a conflict with the Red Guard. Also Russian soldiers participated with the Red Guard in the ensuing 
fight where approximately ten persons died.78 
 
After the failure of the armed uprising, Kock had a nervous breakdown. His associates from both 
liberal and socialist revolutionary camps helped him escape to England and from there to USA, where 
he remained the rest of his life.79 
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Most of the demands of the Great Strike were implemented, but ultimate power remained with the Czar 
and the Russian government under him, and as international relations grew more tense, the Russian 
policy of forced integration of areas tending towards separatism was again enforced also in Finland. 
Once the power of the new Russian Prime Minister Stolypin was consolidated, the relative 
independence that Finland had enjoyed for 1906 and 1907 again was canceled in 1908 with new laws 
for assimilating Finland more closely under the centralized control from St. Petersburg, justified with 
references to revolutionary activities in Finland, among them the Red Guard.80 
 
The Red Guard was dismantled and the members who participated in the mutiny were expelled from 
SDP. However, several Red Guard groups continued their activities secretly as terrorist 
organizations.81 The participants of the mutiny were also among the first Red Guard activists who 
formed the Guards again in 1917, in the build-up of the Finnish civil war of 1918.82 Marja-Leena 
Salkola even considers that the Red Guards of St. Petersburg in 1917 were formed after the model of 
Kock's Guard. The discussion in the bolshevik newspaper Pravda about the formation of such Guards 
was launched by Bonts-Brujevits, who wrote admiringly about the “red proletarian guard” organized by 
“the revolutionary Captain Kock”.83 These Guards of 1917 became revolutionary armies, though 
especially in the case of Finland it is not clear whether that was the intention when they were 
formed.84 
 
 
The achievement and the hangover 
 
One of the larger changes in the country after the Great Strike was the establishment of the single-
chamber parliament with general elections where every citizen, including women, had voting rights.85 
Whereas the earlier mentioned book by A.H. Virkkunen had as its central issue the restoring of the 
established conditions that were in force before 1899 and the struggle for voting rights is not even 
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mentioned in it, the Social Democrat, renowned academic genius Väinö Voionmaa takes this issue and 
the renewal of the structures of decisionmaking as the governing idea of his writing. 
 
The conditions of origin of the two books are different not only due to the political aspirations of their 
writers but also due to the moment of their writing. In those couple of years between the publication of 
Virkkunen’s book and that of Voionmaa’s, the first Finnish parliamentary elections under the principle 
of universal suffrage had been organised and taken place. 
 
Voionmaa promotes the workers’ movement and contends that the voting rights were “undeniably the 
achievement of the workers’ party”86 although it could not have happened until the lower and higher 
classes came in closer political cooperation against the Russian rule, starting in 1899. Otherwise, he 
considers, those “demands would have remained unrealised for a long time”.87 
 
The idea of a general strike as a means to achieve universal suffrage had been discussed in the workers’ 
movement already since 1901, Voionmaa writes.88 Thus Voionmaa contends that the Great Strike was 
“the moment of liberation that had been prepared and expected for so many years” and that 
“[e]verywhere in the great reign of Russia it was primarily a deed of the working class. It was the 
thundering argument of millions who had no voting rights”.89 
 
A couple of months after the Sveaborg mutiny came out a thorough volume in Swedish, titled 
Nationalstrejken i Finland and written by the Finnish historian Sigurd Roos.90 Roos’ work gives a 
complete account of the events of the Great Strike, attempting to give an “objective” pragmatic view. 
In his concluding words Roos, who according to Raoul Palmgren was a constitutionalist,91 does not 
take quite so deterministic an attitude as A.H. Virkkunen, but in any case addresses the workers’ 
movement’s conceptions critically. Roos mentions that it was a widely accepted idea that “the time of 
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‘the proletariat’ had arrived”, that people were “under an illusion” that the strike movement was made 
by the “proletariat” and that the workers’ party was forgetting that the Finnish strike was just an 
outshoot of the gigantic Russian strike. They were demanding to have more power in the country, but 
Roos did not see that as justified.92 
 
Roos sees the Red Guard as disturbing the peace in the society, referring to the earlier mentioned 
conflict between the Protection Guard and the Red Guard during the Sveaborg mutiny.93 This 
apparently minor conflict has also attracted the attention of other historians, among them Eino 
Jutikkala, author of several classics of Finnish history research. In Jutikkala and Pirinen's widely 
translated A History of Finland the event is described as “ominous”, probably with reference to the 
civil war of 1918.94 This is more clearly stated in a later work by Eino Jutikkala with Viljo Rasila and 
Keijo Kulha. There they claim that the Sveaborg mutiny was significant for the internal development of 
Finland as an occasion where the Red Guard opposed the institutions of society and this conflict 
between the two Guards occurred, and thus ”the Sveaborg mutiny was in many ways a precedent of the 
events of 1918”.95 
 
Already during the Great Strike there was an incident between the Red Guard and the Protection 
Guard.96 In that case guns were drawn – but not fired, due to the careful intervention by Johan Kock. 
In Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentilä and Jukka Nevakivi's book A political history of Finland 1809-1995, 
which has also been translated to several languages, this is the only occasion where Kock is 
mentioned.97 In a 1955 essay about the Red Guard Jorma Simpura claims that Kock's command to 
retreat in this situation ”awakened great anger among the Guard where many considered that they 
would have had the strength to overcome and disarm the Protection Guard”.98 In his book about the 
days of the Strike, Kock explains why he backed down: in order to protect the civilian population that 
was present in the street where the conflict occurred. Afterwards he published a public announcement 
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titled To the National Guard, where he explained his reasons, trying to calm the troops.99 
 
Historians have treated Kock's actions during the Sveaborg mutiny as unrealistic; Jutikkala and Pirinen 
write that Kock ”imagined that the revolution had dawned.”100 Y.K. Laine tells that he personally 
discussed with many of the members of the Red Guard of 1906 and that based on those discussions his 
impression is that the members of the Red Guard shared a very strong hatred towards the Russian 
government and that their actions were emotionally motivated and not well thought out. Laine 
concludes that they had very little political experience and that if they had reached power, the results 
would have been disastrous.101 Laine goes even further and refers to claims made by the Finnish 
police intelligence officer Eino Parmanen, who said that the revolutionaries had been set up by the 
Russian secret police which was aware of the whole plan through its agents.102 Also Rasila, Jutikkala 
and Kulha make note that the outcome of the mutiny was simply the growth of the power of Prime 
Minister Stolypin.103 
 
Erkki Salomaa, who was active in the workers' movement in 1960s, published a book about the 
Sveaborg rebellion in 1965. In the book he criticizes Johan Kock harshly. Salomaa states provocatively 
that judging by Kock's actions, he was preparing a career as “the Napoleon of Finland”.104 Y.K. Laine, 
on the other hand, had given a different evaluation: “[...] it is unlikely that Kock would have been 
brewing any kinds of plans of dictatorship.”105 Here I would tend to trust more Laine's judgement 
since he had a closer relation with the ground realities where Kock acted – and also in general appears 
as a more sober observer. 
 
Also novelists have treated the Sveaborg mutiny in at least two historical fiction novels and the famous 
novelist Veijo Meri has written a history book that also tells of the mutiny. I did not find anything 
particularly useful for this project in Meri's book and unfortunately failed to obtain Paavo Rintala's 
novel, but Arvid Järnefelt's Veneh'ojalaiset is very relevant to the theme of this research. 
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Among the few authors with a higher class background who were popular among the Finnish workers' 
movement of 1905-1906, probably the most read was Leo Tolstoy, the Russian contemporary prophet 
of nonviolence and the sharp critic of the established society.106 Arvid Järnefelt was his faithful 
follower and became known as “the Tolstoy of Finland”, the best known tolstoyist writer in Finland. 
Järnefelt knew Johan Kock since childhood and was his close friend and thus it is very likely that 
Järnefelt influenced Kock's social thinking towards tolstoyism.107 
 
According to Pekka Häkli, who wrote Järnefelt's biography and knew him personally quite well (even 
lived with him for more than a year),108 writes that Järnefelt considered Johan Kock as one of the 
finest personalities he had met. To put this in proportion, it should be known that Järnefelt moved in the 
cultural elite of Finland of those times, with names that today are the indisputable cornerstones of the 
Finnish cultural canon – his sister was married with the composer Jean Sibelius; the writer Juhani Aho 
was like a member of family; the national poet Eino Leino, whose verses decorate the Finnish passports 
of today, was an enthusiastic follower of Järnefelt's works.109 
 
But then in 1909, only three years after Johan Kock had moved from Finland, Järnefelt published a 
historical fiction novel called Veneh'ojalaiset, where he paints a caricature of Johan Kock (with a 
different name, but recognizable to all), drawing on the less fortunate aspects of Kock's life, and a 
partly fictional but in many aspects accurate story of the Sveaborg mutiny and its background.110 
Järnefelt's and Kock's friends from the socialist and tolstoyist circles were shocked and Kock did not 
even read the book, as he had read the reviews that his friends wrote in the newspapers. Instead of 
reading the book, Kock wrote several letters to Järnefelt, demanding a public clarification from him, 
but apparently finally Järnefelt got the impression that Kock started threatening him and stopped 
reading Kock's letters.111 It is unlikely that Järnefelt would have expected such a reaction. It appears 
to me rather that Kock's interpretation of Järnefelt's motive in writing the book is correct: Järnefelt was 
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aiming towards writing a bestseller and forgot about or miscalculated in moral considerations.112 Later 
Järnefelt regretted deeply that he came to insult Kock.113 
 
 
Johan Kock 1905-1906 and violence 
 
Antti Häkkinen, a researcher from Helsinki University, claims that while serving in the Russian 
military Kock became alienated from the military life since he had become a tolstoyist pacifist.114 This 
worldview, Häkkinen points out, is in contradiction with the belligerent action of Sveaborg mutiny and 
Häkkinen also considers that the nervous breakdown that Kock experiences in the end of the mutiny is 
not only due to the mutiny's failure, but also due to the bloodshed that Kock did not expect the mutiny 
to be.115 Häkkinen considers that the kind of socialism that Kock professed was ”a mixture of 
enlightenment era's equality ideals, peoples' education and tolstoyism.”116 
 
In contrast to Häkkinen's claim that Kock left the military because of tolstoyism, the tolstoyist par 
excellence Järnefelt paints in Veneh'ojalaiset – in the guise of fiction – a different picture. A central 
feature of the plot of the novel is based on the claim that the Sveaborg mutiny was a part of a 
revolutionary plan which was revealed to Johan Kock by the Russian revolutionaries already when 
Kock was still working in the Russian military. The Sveaborg plan becomes Kock's life mission and the 
practical content of his revolutionary oath.117 Järnefelt has also later, in his 1930 memoires claimed 
that Kock had made a revolutionary vow and that obliged him to leave the imperial military.118 
However, a long term specific revolutionary ”grand plan” implies many risky and complex preparatory 
tasks. Had the SRP, for example, had a hand in arranging the replacement of Luoto by Kock as the 
leader of the Red Guard when the revolutionary moment was nearing? It may be that Kock did leave 
the military because of a revolutionary oath, but the content of the oath was perhaps not as extravagant 
as Järnefelt's fantastic novel. 
                                                 
112  Kock, Johan: Avoin kirje herra Arvid Järnefeltille. Vapaa Ajatus, Helsinki 1916. p. 33-34 
113  Häkli 1955: 382 
114  Häkkinen 2000: 298 
115  Häkkinen 2000: 305, 307 
116  Häkkinen 2000: 304. Translation JU. 
117  Järnefelt, Arvid: Veneh'ojalaiset. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Tampere 1996. p.195-203 
118  Järnefelt, Arvid: Vanhempieni romaani. WSOY, Porvoo 1930. p.172 
27 
 
The failure of the Sveaborg mutiny did not reduce Kock's faith in a violent revolution and armed 
activism. Soikkanen refers to Kock's later writing titled When Will The Betrayal Be Revealed? 
(”Milloin paljastuu petos?”), where Kock mocks ”bourgeois concepts of honour” and emphasizes the 
relativity of moral.119 Soikkanen also refers to this writing when he tells of Kock's role in the mutiny. 
Like other new members in the workers' movement, Kock had not grown into the nonviolent traditions 
of the movement and did not have close relations within it, Soikkanen contends.120 This is an 
interesting claim. As mentioned above, in all likelihood Järnefelt had introduced tolstoyist principles of 
nonviolence to Kock and they had discussed about such issues in many occasions. People like Matti 
Kurikka and Jean Boldt who also propagated tolstoyism, participated or supported Kock's actions both 
during the Great Strike and during the Sveaborg mutiny.121 Thus nonviolence was certainly not 
unknown to Johan Kock on the level of principles or ideals – but probably to him these ideals seemed 
distant from the ground realities of the times. This argument is actually used by Kock in his angry letter 
to Järnefelt, where he scolds Järnefelt for writing about Kock in a bad light in the novel 
Veneh'ojalaiset: ”To life's great questions we people answer with actions, [...] not with words – not 
with tolstoyist or any other definitions of 'what is right', 'what ought we do', etc.”122 
 
Perhaps indeed an emotional motive, rather than any rationally formulated world-view, was a more 
important factor in Kock's revolutionary activities – and in the chosen violent means. Raija Kock 
considers that Johan Kock's central motive in revolutionary action was hatred towards the imperial 
government of Russia, and Finland's independence was the main objective. This is similar to Y.K. 
Laine's impression on the views of the members of the Red Guard, mentioned above. If Finland's 
independence was the main objective, it would explain why Kock had such good relations also with the 
right wing revolutionaries. While Kock's troops clashed with the Protection Guard, both Guards were 
seeking Finland's independence. 
 
Considering the emotional background to the intensity of such hatred, in some way Johan Kock was 
frustrated by many of the experiences he had in the society. He came from an extremely poor, broken 
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family and his stepfather was a violent alcoholic. His mother worked very hard to enable him to go to 
school, but in the end Johan Kock was expelled from school due to an incident of unrest. He was 
probably aware that if he had come from a ”better placed” home, he would in all likelihood not have 
been expelled. He chose the military career to reach a better social position, but experienced arbitrary 
disciplining at the military as repulsive. His business ventures crashed because of a bad timing: an 
international financial crisis.123 Finally during the Great Strike he and others from the workers' 
movement were excluded from the negotiations at Slava, and according to his own testimony he had to 
face aggressions from traditional elites who were suspicious of him as the temporary police chief of 
Helsinki.124 All this coupled with the prevailing conflict-ridden atmosphere of the times may have 
pushed him more and more towards a cynical attitude towards the higher classes. 
 
On the other hand, Johan Kock was not operating alone. I do not consider it likely that he was simply 
an egoist who wanted to become the Napoleon of Finland, like Salomaa wrote. There are no reports of 
him personally acting directly aggressively or violently during the mutiny or the Great Strike. Instead it 
would be quite likely that he was facing some kind of pressure from the Russian revolutionaries and 
also even from within the Red Guard. According to Hannu Soikkanen the SRP was a militant 
organization which used all means available125 and according to Antti Kujala's sources the party 
leadership of socialist revolutionaries of Russia thought in August 1905 that the time for the revolution 
would come in spring 1906.126 It is unclear what was the position of Johan Kock in the networks of 
the revolutionary movement in Russia and how much he was connected to the movement, but if his 
home had acted as a meeting place, he may have been quite deeply involved. We could imagine that 
once certain secrets were revealed to him, there was no turning back. That Kock was under heavy 
pressure during the mutiny, is also demonstrated by his nervous breakdown that was reported by 
several persons independently from each other.127 On the other hand, we have already considered that 
in his later writings he continued advocating armed revolution – in all likelihood quite voluntarily. 
 
As for Johan Kock not having close relations within the workers' movement, that claim seems a bit 
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exaggerated, as the mentioned Kurikka and Boldt were also well known public figures in the workers' 
movement. However, Kurikka, who had proposed Kock in the first place as the leader of the National 
Guard, was being kicked out from the workers' movement after the Great Strike. Kurikka and Boldt 
adhered to utopian views from theosophy and tolstoyism and were considered eccentric in the Finnish 
workers' movement which was heading in a direction of dogmatic adherence to the thoughts of Marx 
and Kautsky.128 Perhaps Kurikka and Boldt then found that the only effective alliance could be found 
among the revolutionaries like Kock, who in any case was their personal friend and earlier collaborator 
in public ideological discussions.129 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Here I have attempted to understand Johan Kock's more or less violence-related actions and choices 
during the Great Strike and the Sveaborg mutiny in Helsinki, based on the available literature. In broad 
strikes, during the Great Strike Kock's role was that of preventing violence whereas during the 
Sveaborg mutiny it was that of assisting violence, leading to escalations of violent situations both at 
Sveaborg and in the streets of the city. 
 
I have considered some factors that influence violence in actions. Those factors are world-view, 
relations and emotional motives. Johan Kock's actions during these events have, to my knowledge, not 
been considered in this extent or manner by others.130 The personal dimension tends to be 
overshadowed by the dramatic mass events and processes. About the personal motives of a person we 
can only present interpretations, not solid definitions; but a history that excludes or belittles the 
personal dimension is not a history of human beings. Without impartial scientific enquiry and careful 
research into the realm of personal experience, history writing about human individuals is left in the 
hands of historical fiction, driven by arbitrary motives. 
 
On the other hand, the meaning of individual actions is also tied to the social context. In this case the 
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social context is dramatic, instable. The process of historical acceleration (referred to in page 9) creates 
the probability of increasing instability and change, and the risks and processes related to instable 
situations are today of much interest. 
 
The presence of the theme of violence calls for moral judgements. Opposing factions appropriate 
history and use it to further their cause, as is seen in the way Bonts-Brujevits used the memory of Johan 
Kock as the leader of the Red Guard in order to inspire the creation of revolutionary armies. Modern 
historians have shown restraint towards open moral judgements, but when constructing a historical 
account of a flow of events, it is very difficult not to imply that the fruits of certain kinds of thoughts or 
actions are rather unfavourable to those involved. Making some kind of moral judgements is thus 
practically inevitable and the real challenge for a historian is to develop an ethical insight that makes it 
possible to evaluate sources, events and even the thoughts and actions of historical characters critically 
but simultaneously not to dismiss the favourable aspects of historical intentions and understandings. 
 
In spite of the ensuing violence by the Red Guard and in spite of all due critical evaluation of this self-
advertising statement of Johan Kock about the Great Strike, I will leave the last words to Johan Kock 
himself: 
 
”People, who have been educated into the lies of the society, were used to considering these public 
authorities [...] as so necessary, that when they would be closed down, the greatest accident and chaos 
would occur [...] And what happened. Even though there was no other government than a quickly 
gathered workers' strike committee, everywhere such peace and order reigned that never before has 
been seen in Finland. That was the government of the proletariat, may others learn to govern in the 
same manner.”131 
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Johan Adolf Kock (1861-1914) var den provisoriske chef for arbejdernes sikkerhedsvagt i Helsinki i 
løbet af Den Store Strejke af 1905 og oprøret i Sveaborg søfæstning i 1906. Undersøgelsen betragter 
hvordan temaet vold er reflekteret i udgivet litteratur over handlingerne af Johan Kock i løbet af Den 
Store Strejke og oprøret i Sveaborg. Undersøgelser fra den Finske arbejderbevægelses historikere Y.K. 
Laine og Hannu Soikkanen virker som hovedkilder sammen med betragtninger fra samtidige kilder fra 
starten af 1900-tallet. Også undersøgelser af andre fremstående historikere er diskuteret; blandt andet 
Osmo Jussila, Eino Jutikkala, Antti Häkkinen, Risto Alapuro, Antti Kujala, Raoul Palmgren, Marja-
Leena Salkola og Steven Duncan Huxley. Undersøgelsen belyser moderne Europæisk historie med 
udgangspunkt i spørgsmål om metodologi af sociale forandringer i spændingsfeltet mellem evolutionær 
og revolutionær socialisme. Med hermeneutisk reflektion findes voldstematiken i Johan Kock's 
handlinger set i forhold til hans verdenssyn, andre mennesker i samfundet og emotionelle motiver. 
Herunder er den sociale kontekst af arbejderbevægelsen og andre politiske krafter i Finland i 
begyndelsen af 1900-tallet taget i betragtning. 
 
